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JOINT INFRINGEMENT:  CIRCUMVENTING THE PATENT SYSTEM THROUGH 
“COLLABORATIVE” INFRINGEMENT 
 
Vincent Ferraro 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As identified by the Federal Circuit, joint infringement exists where no single entity 
directly performs all the steps of a method claim or provides or uses all the components of a 
system claim.
1
  Under the new standard for joint patent infringement recently developed by the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (hereinafter “the Federal Circuit”), avoiding liability for 
patent infringement is as easy as collaborating with a third party to divide up the tasks necessary 
to infringe a patent.
2
  More specifically, under the new standard for joint infringement, if 
multiple parties collaborate to infringe a patented claim and neither party is the “mastermind” or 
“directs or controls” the other, than all parties are likely to be absolved of patent infringement.3  
Escaping liability for patent infringement should not be this easy.  Alarmingly, for patent 
owners, the new standard for joint infringement creates an enormous loophole in the law of 
patent infringement—one that is easily exploited by accused infringers to avoid any liability for 
patent infringement.   And, even more troubling, the loophole encourages behavior fully 
contemplated and later endorsed by the Federal Circuit, as acceptable conduct for accused 
infringers and as a valid defense to allegations of patent infringement.
4
  Put simply, the loophole 
created by the Federal Circuit not only flouts the patent system, but provides a grave injustice to 
all patent owners who own a patent that requires multiple parties to infringe it. 
                                                          
1
 BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1378-1381 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
2
 See Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
3
 See id. 
4
 See BMC Res., Inc., 498 F.3d at 1379, 1381; see also Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 629 F.3d 
1311, 1321-1322 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
2 
 
While Courts have been aware of and have decided cases involving infringement by 
multiple parties for quite some time, the theory of joint patent infringement has only very 
recently taken shape.
5
  This paper traces the evolution of the new jurisprudence on joint 
infringement recently developed by the Federal Circuit.  Specifically, in 2007, the Federal 
Circuit issued a seminal decision, BMC Resources, Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., where, seemingly 
for the first time, it allegedly set forth the “proper standard for joint infringement by multiple 
parties of a single claim.”6  It is BMC Resources where the Federal Circuit drastically diverged 
from earlier precedent regarding joint infringement by introducing a new heightened standard for 
proving direct infringement by multiple parties.
7
  The Federal Circuit referred to the new 
standard as the “direction or control” standard and held that to establish infringement of a claim 
requiring the actions of multiple parties, one of the parties must direct or control the activities of 
the other.
8
 
Likewise, in a subsequent case involving joint infringement, Muniauction, Inc. v. 
Thomson Corp., the Federal Circuit endorsed this newly minted standard
9
 and arguably extended 
it by setting forth a vicarious liability standard.
10
  But BMC Resources and Muniauction were 
                                                          
5
 See, e.g., Wallace v. Holmes, 29 F. Cas. 74, 80 (C.C.D. Conn. 1871); Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. 
Eureka Specialty Co., 77 F. 288, 296-298 (6th Cir. Mich. 1896); New Jersey Patent Co. v. Schaeffer, 159 F. 171, 
173 (C.C.D. Pa. 1908); Peerless Equipment Co. v. W. H. Miner, Inc., 93 F.2d 98, 105 (7th Cir. 1937); Aro Mfg. Co. 
v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 500 (U.S. 1964); Shields v. Halliburton Co., 493 F. Supp. 1376, 
1389 (W.D. La. 1980); Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate, Inc., 720 F.2d 1565, 1567-1568 (Fed. Cir. 1983); and 
BMC Res., Inc., 498 F.3d at 1379-1381. 
6
 BMC Res., Inc., 498 F.3d at 1378. 
7
 Id. at 1381-1382. 
8
 Id. 
9
 Muniauction, Inc., 532 F.3d at 1329 (citing BMC Res., Inc., 498 F.3d at 1380-1381) (“[w]here the actions of 
multiple parties combine to perform every step of a claimed method, the claim is directly infringed only if one party 
exercises ‘control or direction’ over the entire process such that every step is attributable to the controlling party, 
i.e., the ‘mastermind.’”). 
10
 Id. at 1330 (“[u]nder BMC Resources, the control or direction standard is satisfied in situations where the law 
would traditionally hold the accused direct infringer vicariously liable for the acts committed by another party that 
are required to complete performance of a claimed method.”). 
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just the beginning for joint infringement, as the Federal Circuit took several opportunities in the 
years following these two watershed decisions to further develop and shape this area of the law.
11
   
This paper begins by providing a brief background of the patent system, the policy 
reasons for instituting the patent system, and the development of patent infringement liability.  
Section III traces the roots of the concept of joint infringement from BMC Resources and 
Muniauction and tracks its evolution through the Federal Circuit, by discussing and analyzing 
such cases as Golden Hour Data Sys., Inc. v. emsCharts, Inc., Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight 
Networks, Inc., Centillion Data Sys., LLC v. Qwest Communs. Int’l, Inc., and McKesson Techs., 
Inc. v. Epic Sys. Corp.  Then, Section IV summarizes the current state of the law of joint 
infringement based on the above-referenced Federal Circuit decisions.  Section V provides 
insight as to the potential impact that these decisions may have on the rights of patent owners, as 
well as the impact it may have on the patent system and the public.  Finally, Section VI sets forth 
several remedial measures that the legislature and judiciary can implement in an attempt to close 
the judicially created loop hole created by the Federal Circuit.  
 
II. BACKGROUND 
 
a. The Patent System 
 
On April 10, 1790, Congress enacted the Patent Act of 1790 and with this act the United 
States patent system was born.
12
  Congress’s legislative power to enact such a statute is rooted in 
Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution, which reads:  “[t]o promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
                                                          
11
 See Golden Hour Data Sys. v. emsCharts, Inc., 614 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight 
Networks, Inc., 629 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Centillion Data Sys., LLC v. Qwest Communs. Int’l, 631 F.3d 1279 
(Fed. Cir. 2011); and McKesson Techs. Inc. v. Epic Sys. Corp., 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 7531 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 12, 
2011).  
12
 See Patent Act of 1790. 
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exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”13  Since 1790 the United States 
patent system underwent several changes via, inter alia, the Patent Act of 1836, the Patent Act of 
1952, and most recently the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act.
14
  Despite the extensive 
transformation that the U.S. patent system underwent from 1790 to present, several key 
components of the patent system remained true throughout.  For example, one thing that has 
essentially remained unchanged since the inception of the United States patent system is the right 
for an inventor to receive a patent for his or her invention.
15
  Notably, another basic tenet of the 
patent system that has existed since its inception is the notion that whoever invents a new, useful 
and unobvious machine, process, or composition of matter is entitled to a patent.
16
  It has also 
been and continues to be a well established principle of patent law that a patent grants the patent 
owner with a negative or exclusionary right.
17
  That is, the patent owner has the right to exclude 
anyone from making, using or selling the patented invention in the United States.
18
  Finally, it 
has been and remains a bedrock principle of patent law that the right to exclude afforded to the 
patent owner by the patent is only for a limited time.
19
 
Aside from Congress’s legislative power to enact patent laws under the Constitution, 
there are strong public policy reasons that support the creation and implementation of a patent 
system.
20
  The patent system is essentially a bargain between the inventor and the public.
21
  On 
one side, an inventor expends money to research and develop inventions and in turn makes those 
inventions available to the public, thereby increasing the wealth of public knowledge and 
                                                          
13
 U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, Cl. 8. 
14
 See Patent Act of 1836; Patent Act of 1952; and Leahy-Smith America Invents Act. 
15
 Patent Act of 1790, § 1; Patent Act of 1836, § 6; and Patent Act of 1952, § 101. 
16
 Patent Act of 1790, § 1; Patent Act of 1836, § 6; and Patent Act of 1952, § 101. 
17
 Patent Act of 1790, § 1, 4; Patent Act of 1836, § 5, 6, 14, 17; and Patent Act of 1952, § 271. 
18
 Patent Act of 1790, § 1, 4; Patent Act of 1836, § 5, 6, 14, 17; and Patent Act of 1952, § 271. 
19
 Patent Act of 1790, § 1; Patent Act of 1836, § 5; and Patent Act of 1952, § 154. 
20
 See Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141 (U.S. 1989). 
21
 Id. at 150-151. 
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arguably in many instances increasing the public’s standard of living.22  On the other side, the 
public, via the patent system, transfers, for a limited time, to the inventor the right to exclude 
others from making, using, selling, or offering for sale the invention in the United States.
23
  It is 
this “bargain” that creates an incentive for inventors to continue to expend their time and money 
in an effort to further develop new and innovative technologies.
24
  Arguably, without such an 
incentive, there would simply be no justification to expend time or resources for the development 
of new technologies.  This would be extremely detrimental to the public as innovation would 
cease to exist in the United States and the storehouse of public knowledge would essentially 
languish.   
b. The Legal Bounds of a Patent 
It is also well established United States patent law that the claims of a patent define the 
“metes and bounds” of the invention—in other words—the scope of the patent owner’s rights in 
the invention.
25
  The claims of a patent consist of elements that define the scope of the 
invention.
26
  System claims comprise elements that make up the entire claimed system or 
apparatus.
27
  Likewise, method claims comprise steps for performing the entire claimed 
process.
28
  In short, it is the claims of a patent that provide the bounds of the patent owner’s legal 
right to the patented invention.
29
   As such, the patent owner has a right to exclude anyone from 
making, using, and selling the claimed invention,
30
 which, if drafted by a skilled patent 
                                                          
22
 Id. 
23
 Id. 
24
 Id. 
25
 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (“It is a ‘bedrock principle’ of patent law 
that the claims of a patent define the invention to which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.”). 
26
 Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
27
 Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312. 
28
 See Vitronics Corp., 90 F.3d at 1579. 
29
 Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312. 
30
 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1952). 
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prosecutor, may be much broader in scope than just the one embodiment developed by the 
inventor. 
 
c. Establishing Liability for Patent Infringement 
As a threshold matter, to establish infringement of a patent—whether direct or indirect 
infringement—the patent owner must prove that an entity makes, uses, or sells a system or 
apparatus that comprises all the elements or limitations of the asserted system claim or performs 
all the steps of the asserted method claim.
31
  It is well established Supreme Court law that to 
directly infringe the claim of a patent under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), the alleged infringer must make, 
use, offer to sell, or sell an apparatus that satisfies every element of the asserted system claim or 
perform every step of the asserted method claim.
32
  This is commonly known as the “all elements 
rule.”33 
A patent owner, alternatively, can prevail on its patent infringement claim by showing the 
alleged infringer indirectly infringes the asserted patents.
34
  Indeed, Congress has provided a 
remedy to patent owners for alleged infringers that do not make, use, offer to sell, or sell a 
system that reads on every limitation of a system claim or perform every step of a method 
clam.
35
  Notably, this type of infringement is commonly referred to as indirect infringement.
36
  
Under the current patent laws, there are two types of indirect infringement—infringement by 
inducement and contributory infringement.
37
  Both scenarios, nevertheless, still require there to 
                                                          
31
 See e.g., Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40-41 (U.S. 1997); Joy Technologies v. 
Flakt, Inc., 6 F.3d 770, 773 (Fed. Cir. 1993); and Dynacore Holdings Corp. v. U.S. Philips Corp., 363, F.3d 1263, 
1272 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
32
 Warner-Jenkinson Corp., 520 U.S. at 29. 
33
 TIP Sys., LLC v. Phillips & Brooks/Gladwin, Inc., 529 F.3d 1364, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2008).  
34
 BMC Res., Inc., 498 F.3d at 1379. 
35
 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)-(c) (1952). 
36
 BMC Res., Inc., 498 F.3d at 1379. 
37
 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)-(c) (1952). 
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be a direct infringer and some culpable conduct by the accused infringer.
38
  That is, indirect 
infringement can only arise when the accused indirect infringer has some knowledge of the 
patent and arguably some intent to infringe the patent—at the very least it must be shown that the 
alleged infringer continued to infringe the patent despite its knowledge of the patent’s 
existence.
39
  Generally, an alleged infringer may be found liable for inducing infringement under 
Section 271(b) when it has encouraged, aided or caused another entity to directly infringe the 
asserted claims of the patent.
40
  Likewise, an alleged infringer may be found liable for 
contributory infringement under Section 271(c) when it sells a component that has a particular 
function when implemented with a system that directly infringes the asserted claims of the 
patent.
41
   
At the outset, it is abundantly clear that Congress has not expressly provided a remedy to 
patent owners for infringement by multiple separate entities where none of the entities directly 
infringe the asserted claim.  Herein lies the root of the problem, because, in light of this statutory 
gap, accused infringers are able to completely avoid liability for patent infringement by simply 
collaborating with other entities to carry out the claimed invention, as long as none of the parties 
involved directly infringe the patent.  And in light of the Federal Circuit’s recent holdings 
condoning this type of behavior, alleged infringers can continue to exploit this loophole without 
any repercussions, leaving patent owners remediless for the infringement of their patents. 
One of the early recognitions of the “joint” or “collaborative” infringement scenario 
surfaced in Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., a Supreme Court decision.
42
  In 
an effort to overcome Congress’s apparent oversight of this “joint” infringement scenario, the 
                                                          
38
 See BMC Res., Inc., 498 F.3d at 1379; and DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
39
 DSU Med. Corp., 471 F.3d at 1304. 
40
 Id. at 1304-1305. 
41
 Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 340-342 (U.S. 1961). 
42
 Aro Mfg. Co., 377 U.S. at 501. 
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Supreme Court endorsed an exception or carve-out to the strict requirements of the patent 
infringement statute for parties acting together to jointly infringe the asserted patent.
43
  
Particularly, the Supreme Court held that contributory infringement “is a species of joint-
tortfeasor, who is held liable because he has contributed with another to the causing of a single 
harm to the plaintiff.”44  The Supreme Court’s reasoning for its decision was rooted in principles 
of tort law and particularly with respect to the tort theory of joint and several liability.
45
  
However, merely raising the issue without setting forth a particular test or method for lower 
courts to employ in determining liability for joint infringement by multiple parties, and in the 
absence of any other appellate level court dealing with a similar issue, District Courts were left 
without any real direction in this area of the law.   
Eventually, some District Courts adopted and applied the “some connection” standard for 
cases involving joint infringement.
46
  It was not until 2007, that the Federal Circuit squarely 
addressed the issue of joint infringement in BMC Resources.
47
  As will be discussed and 
analyzed in detail below, it is the BMC Resources decision, which set forth the “direction and 
control” standard48 that served as the source of several Federal Circuit opinions, which 
eventually led to the stringent “agency” or “contractual relationship” standard set forth in the 
Federal Circuit’s Akamai decision in 2010.49  The net result of these Federal Circuit decisions:  a 
                                                          
43
 Id. 
44
 Id. 
45
 Id. at 502, 506 (In Birdsell v. Shaliol, supra, 112 U.S., at 489, the Court applied to a patent case the proposition 
that “By our law, judgment against one joint trespasser, without full satisfaction, is no bar to a suit against another 
for the same trespass.”; And in cases of joint infringement this Court was said to have declared the doctrine that, 
whereas “when the total damage sustained has been paid by one tort-feasor, the damages cannot be duplicated 
through a recovery against another.”). 
46
 BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37746, *9 (N.D. Tex. May 24, 2006) (“District courts 
vary, however, as to what kind of "connection" between the entities they require a party to prove to show direct 
infringement.  In Faroudja, the court stated that ‘some connection’ must exist between the entities, but also 
suggested that the entities must work ‘in concert.’”). 
47
 BMC Res., Inc., 498 F.3d at1379. 
48
 Id. at 1381, 1382. 
49
 Akamai Techs., Inc., 629 F.3d at 1320. 
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judicially created loophole ripe for exploitation by accused infringers leaving patent owners 
without a remedy for the blatant infringement of their patents.  
 
 
 
III. BMC RESOURCES AND ITS PROGENY 
 
a. BMC Resources, Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
In 2007, the Federal Circuit, in BMC Resources, Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d (Fed. 
Cir. 2007), via Circuit Judges Rader, Gajarsa, and Prost, attempted to determine and set forth the 
proper standard for establishing joint patent infringement of an asserted method claim by 
multiple parties.
50
  Essentially, the Federal Circuit had to decide the relationship that must exist 
between multiple parties involved in the infringement of an asserted method claim, where no one 
party performs all of the claimed method steps, that would rise to the level of direct infringement 
under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
51
   
The Plaintiff BMC Resources owns two patents, U.S. Patent Nos. 5,715,298 (the “’298 
patent”) and 5,870,456 (the “’456 patent).52  Briefly stated, these patents claim a method for 
processing debit transactions over a telephone network without the use of a personal 
identification number (PIN) provided by the combined action of several separate and distinct 
entities.
53
  Specifically, the patented invention provides an interface between a customer’s 
telephone, a debit network, and a financial institution, thereby allowing the customer to conduct 
real-time payment transactions via the customer’s telephone.54  The claimed invention first 
allows the customer to enter account and payment information via an interactive voice response 
                                                          
50
 BMC Res., Inc., 498 F.3d at1379 (“The case presents the issue of the proper standard for joint infringement by 
multiple parties of a single claim.”). 
51
 Id.  (“With other parties performing some claimed method steps, this court must determine if Paymentech may 
nonetheless be liable for direct infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).”). 
52
 Id. at 1375. 
53
 Id. 
54
 Id. 
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unit accessible from the customer’s telephone.55  This information then passes through to a debit 
network (e.g., an ATM network) and on to the customer’s financial institution (e.g., a bank), 
where the financial institution carries out the customer’s requested payment transaction.56   
Admittedly, Defendant, “Paymentech processes financial transactions for clients as a 
third party.”57  In essence, Paymentech’s job is to receive payment information from the 
merchant and route it to a participating debit network to facilitate the payment transaction.
58
  In 
light of Paymentech’s participation in conducting financial transactions, BMC Resources 
accused Paymentech of infringing claim 7 of the ’456 patent, which depends from claim 6, 
supra, and claim 2 of the ’298 patent, which depends from claim 1.59  Crucial to the threshold 
issue, the parties agreed that Paymentech did not perform every step required by the asserted 
method claims.
60
  As such, the Federal Circuit had to determine whether Paymentech could still 
be held liable for direct infringement under a joint infringement theory.
61
 
The Court started its analysis by first setting forth the basic principle of establishing 
liability for the direct infringement of a claim.
62
  Additionally, the Court recited the law on 
indirect infringement:  “when a defendant participates in or encourages infringement but does 
not directly infringe a patent, the normal recourse under the law is for the court to apply the 
standards for liability under indirect infringement.”63  The Court then set forth the well 
                                                          
55
 Id. 
56
 Id. 
57
 Id. 
58
 See id. at 1375-1376. 
59
 Id. at 1376-1377. 
60
 Id. at 1378. 
61
 See id. 
62
 Id.  (citing Warner-Jenkinson Co., 520 U.S. 40) (“Direct infringement requires a party to perform or use each and 
every step or element of a claimed method or product.”); and Id., at 1380 (citing Warner-Jenkinson Co., 520 U.S. at 
40) (“Infringement requires, as it always has, a showing that a defendant has practiced each and every element of the 
claimed invention.”).   
63
 Id. at 1379. 
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established principle that, as a predicate, indirect infringement requires a finding that an entity 
directly infringes the asserted claim by performing all of the required steps.
64
 
While the Federal Circuit acknowledged the potential loophole for a party to elude 
infringement by having a separate entity perform at least one of the claimed steps on its behalf, 
or even by entering into an arms-length agreement, it promptly foreclosed the possibility of such 
a result by reasoning that the “law imposes vicarious liability on a party for the acts of another in 
circumstances showing that the liable party controlled the conduct of the acting party.”65  The 
Federal Circuit appeared confident that this meant that an alleged infringer cannot therefore 
avoid liability for patent infringement by having a third party perform one or more of the claimed 
steps on its behalf.
66
  The Court continued by stating that “a party cannot avoid infringement … 
simply by contracting out steps of a patented process to another entity.”67  In those cases, the 
Court wrote, the party in control, or the “mastermind,” would be liable for direct infringement.68  
Yet, contrary to these statements, the Federal Circuit, earlier in the decision, supported previous 
cases that held that an accused party cannot be liable for direct infringement when the accused 
party does not perform all the steps of the asserted method claim.
69
 
Even though the Court acknowledged that parties could potentially beat the system by 
developing agreements that fell short of the direction and control requirement, thereby escaping 
liability, the Court was neither impressed nor sympathetic to the patent owner’s cause.70  The 
Court determined that such a concern did not outweigh concerns of overreaching the rules of 
                                                          
64
 Id. 
65
 Id. 
66
 Id. 
67
 Id. at 1381. 
68
 Id. (“It would be unfair indeed for the mastermind in such situations to escape liability.”).   
69
 Id. at 1380. 
70
 See id. at 1381. 
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patent infringement.
71
  The Court mentions that it particularly wanted to avoid undermining the 
statutory scheme for indirect infringement, as set forth by Congress.
72
  The Court also indicated 
that concerns involving a party avoiding infringement by cooperation with another entity in most 
instances can be offset simply by proper claim drafting—i.e., by drafting claims to only require 
the actions of one entity.
73
  In perhaps the Court’s most difficult statement to swallow for current 
and future patent owners, the Court indicated that it will not restructure claims or legal standards 
to “remedy ill-conceived claims.”74 
Applying the new “direction or control” standard, the Federal Circuit held that 
Paymentech did not infringe the asserted claims because it did perform every step of the asserted 
method claims nor did it direct or control any third party entity to perform the missing step or 
steps of the asserted method claims.
75
  Accordingly, because it was found that Paymentech did 
not perform nor cause to perform every step of the asserted method claim, it cannot be held liable 
for direct infringement.
76
  Finally, because no one entity performed each step of the asserted 
method claims, the Court held that Paymentech could not be found liable for indirect 
infringement.
77
   
In deciding BMC Resources, the Federal Circuit clearly took a decisive step with respect 
to the development of the legal landscape of joint infringement.  More specifically, the Federal 
Circuit expressly moved away from the “some connection” standard and, in its place, set forth 
the “direction or control” standard.78  The Federal Circuit held that to directly infringe a method 
claim of a patent, one party must perform, or cause to be performed each and every step of the 
                                                          
71
 Id. 
72
 Id. 
73
 Id. 
74
 Id. 
75
 See id. at 1381, 1382. 
76
 Id. 
77
 Id. 
78
 See id. at 1378, 1381, 1382. 
13 
 
claimed method.
79
  As set forth by the Federal Circuit, to show that an alleged infringer caused a 
step of the claimed method to be performed by a third party, the patent owner must establish that 
the alleged infringer directed or controlled that third party to perform the missing steps.
80
   
Unfortunately, the Federal Circuit did not provide much guidance on applying the 
“direction or control” standard, however, it is clear from the decision that contracting out certain 
steps of a patented process to a third party would fall squarely within the necessary direction and 
control to find the alleged infringer liable for direct infringement.
81
  In such a case, the party in 
control would be liable for direct infringement, as it would be deemed the “mastermind” and thus 
unable to escape liability.
82
  While the Federal Circuit, BMC Resources, set forth a new standard 
for joint infringement, it also left open several questions.  The main question being, what exactly 
was meant by “direction or control,” and in particular, how much “direction or control” does an 
accused infringer need to exercise over a third party to be found liable under a joint infringement 
theory.  A secondary question also remained in the wake of the BMC Resources decision—can 
the theory of joint infringement be applied to system claims as well as method claims.  As will 
be discussed in further detail below, over the last 5 years the Federal Circuit has further 
developed the law on the theory of joint infringement and even has provided answers to some of 
the open issues lingering from BMC Resources. 
b. Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
Shortly following BMC Resources, on July 14, 2008, the Federal Circuit issued the next 
installment in the joint infringement saga with its decision in Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson 
                                                          
79
 See id. at 1382. 
80
 See id. at 1381, 1382. 
81
 Id. at 1381. 
82
 Id. 
14 
 
Corp., 532 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
83
  In Muniauction, the Federal Circuit, via a panel 
consisting of Judge Gajarsa, Judge Plager and Judge Prost, not only espoused the “direction or 
control” standard set forth in BMC Resource, but expounded on it by probing further into the 
question of just how much “direction or control” must be exerted by the accused infringer to be 
found liable for patent infringement.
84
  Notably, the Federal Circuit further delineated the 
“direction and control” standard by setting forth the types of relationships and required control 
necessary to satisfy the “direction and control” standard.85  While providing further insight into 
the “direction and control” standard, the issue on appeal was tailored rather closely to the facts of 
the specific case, namely “whether the actions of at least the bidder and the auctioneer may be 
combined under the law so as to give rise to a finding of direct infringement by the auctioneer.”86 
In this case, Muniauction asserted U.S. Patent No. 6,161,099 (“the ’099 patent”) against 
the Defendant, Thomson.
87
  The ’099 patent is directed to an electronic method “for conducting 
‘original issuer auctions of financial instruments.’”88  In short, the ’099 patent provides a system 
that allows issuers of financial instruments to run and monitor the progress of an auction while 
allowing bidders to prepare, submit, and monitor their bids during the auction.
89
  The claimed 
invention, as set forth in exemplary claim 1 requires inputting data associated with a bid for a 
fixed income financial instrument via a bidder’s computer, calculating an interest cost value 
based on the inputted data via a issuer’s computer, submitting the bid, via the bidder’s computer, 
transmitting the bid from the bidder’s computer to an issuer’s computer via an electronic 
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network, communicating the bid to the issuer’s computer, and displaying the bid on the issuer’s 
computer.
90
 
The Defendants’ accused instrumentality, the PARITY system, allows bidders to access 
bid calculation software on a central server via a computer network and input data to calculate an 
interest cost for a given bid.
91
  Bidders are then permitted to submit a bid to the central server, 
via the computer network, whereby the bids are transmitted to and displayed on the issuer’s 
computer.
92
  Muniauction accused Thomson’s PARITY system of infringing the ’099 patent and 
subsequently filed suit against Thomson for patent infringement.
93
  Muniauction alleged that 
Thomson infringed method claims 1, 2, 9, 14, 18, 20, 24, 31, 32, 36, 40, 42, 46, and 56 of the 
’099 patent by conducting auctions via its PARITY system.  Thomson argued that, under the 
theory of joint infringement, it could not be held liable for infringing the asserted claims.
94
  In 
response to Muniauction’s allegations, Thomson argued that it did not infringe the asserted 
claims because it neither performed nor caused to be performed each step of the asserted method 
claims.
95
  In fact, the parties even agreed that the asserted method claims required actions by 
multiple parties, for example, the auctioneer’s system and the bidders.96   
Considering this was another classic joint infringement scenario, the Federal Circuit in 
Muniauction started its analysis by first acknowledging the new standard it had set forth in BMC 
Resources.
97
  The Court also reiterated the now well settled law that direct infringement requires 
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a single party to perform every step of a claimed method.
98
  Once again this Court acknowledged 
the tension between the strict requirements of direct infringement and the concerns of allowing 
accused infringers to escape liability for infringement by having another entity carry out at least 
one of the claimed steps on its behalf.
99
   
The Federal Circuit in Muniauction not only adopted the “direction and control” standard 
for joint infringement set forth in BMC Resources, it wholeheartedly endorsed the standard by 
reiterating and subsequently applying it to the facts of this case.
100
  The Federal Circuit also 
refused to let die the notion that mere “arms-length cooperation” will not give rise to direct 
infringement by any party.
101
  In endorsing the BMC Resources rule, the Federal Circuit once 
again affirmed that the holding in On Demand did not rely on the relationship between the 
parties and therefore should essentially be restricted to the facts of the case with respect to the 
joint infringement issue.
102
 
To determine this case in light of the standard laid down in BMC Resources, the Federal 
Circuit had to determine “whether Thomson sufficiently controls or directs other parties (e.g., the 
bidder) such that Thomson itself can be said to have performed every step of the asserted 
claims.”103  The Federal Circuit held that Thomson did not infringe the asserted claims because 
Thomson neither performed every step of the claimed methods nor had another party perform 
steps on its behalf.
104
  The Court reasoned that the relationship between Thomson, an auctioneer, 
and its customers, bidders, did not rise to the level of the relationship necessary to satisfy the 
                                                          
98
 Id. 
99
 Id. 
100
 Id.  (“[W]here the actions of multiple parties combine to perform every step of a claimed method, the claim is 
directly infringed only if one party exercises ‘control or direction’ over the entire process such that every step is 
attributable to the controlling party, i.e., the ‘mastermind.’”). 
101
 Id. 
102
 Id. 
103
 Id. 
104
 Id. at 1330. 
17 
 
“direction and control” required under the theory of joint infringement.105  Particularly, it was 
determined that Thomson did not exert “direction or control” over the bidders such that the 
bidder’s actions may be attributable to Thomson—i.e., that Thomson might be vicariously liable 
for actions of the bidders.
106
 
In finding Thomson free of liability under the theory of joint infringement, the Federal 
Circuit expounded on the “direction or control” required to find liability under joint infringement 
by setting forth yet another vague standard:  “the control or direction standard is satisfied in 
situations where the law would traditionally hold the accused direct infringer vicariously liable 
for the acts committed by another party that are required to complete performance of a claimed 
method.”107  While the Federal Circuit attempted to clarify the “direction or control” standard of 
BMC Resources, its repudiation of a particular relationship was equally, if not more, instructive 
with respect to the standard.  Notably, the Federal Circuit provided some assistance in this body 
of law by indicating that providing access to a system and instructing customers on its use is not 
sufficient to find liability for direct infringement under the theory of joint infringement.
108
  With 
the Federal Circuit appearing to now require that the actions of a third party must be performed 
on behalf of the accused infringer or that the accused must be found to be vicariously liable for 
the acts of the third party under traditional law, more questions may have raised than answered.  
Most importantly, it is unclear what exactly the Court meant by vicarious liability or performing 
steps “on behalf” of the accused infringer.  Was this the Court’s attempt to require an agency-
type relationship between the joint actors? 
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c. Golden Hour Data Systems, Inc. v. Emscharts, Inc., 614 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 
2010) 
 
The next case regarding joint infringement did not appear again before the Federal 
Circuit until the Summer of 2010 when it decided Golden Hour Data Sys., Inc. v. emsCharts, 
Inc., 614 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
109
  In a split decision, the Federal Circuit, via a panel 
consisting of Judges Newman, Friedman, and Dyk, once again affirmed the standard for joint 
infringement set forth in BMC Resources.
110
  The more intriguing aspect of this opinion is Judge 
Newman’s dissent, as it seems the relatively new theory has finally begun to stir up dissension 
among at least one of the Federal Circuit judges.
111
 
In a rather terse majority opinion, the Federal Circuit, for at least the third time now, 
merely echoed the law on joint infringement as set forth in BMC Resources and subsequently 
affirmed in Muniauction:  “[w]here the combined actions of multiple parties are alleged to 
infringe process claims, the patent holder must prove that one party exercised ‘control or 
direction’ over the entire process such that all steps of the process can be attributed to the 
controlling party, i.e., the ‘mastermind.’”112  In affirming the lower court, the Federal Circuit 
simply held that that the relationship between the Defendants was insufficient to infer control or 
direction and therefore, the Defendants were found not to infringe the asserted method claims.
113
  
With respect to the asserted system claims, the Federal Circuit found for the Plaintiff on a 
technicality.
114
  The Plaintiff, Golden Hour, argued that emsCharts was liable for infringement 
because emsCharts sold its software and Defendant, Softtech’s software together, and together 
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these systems comprised the systems of the asserted claims.
115
  In finding no infringement by 
either Defendant under a joint infringement theory, the Court reasoned that “[s]uch a sale might 
well create liability on the part of emsCharts for the sale of the patented system,” regardless of 
whether or not emsCharts controlled Softtech.
116
  The Court, however, stuck to its holding of 
non-infringement, because, by agreement, only a joint infringement theory was submitted to the 
jury for the infringement of these claims.
117
   
While not expressly providing any further instructions for analyzing joint infringement 
cases, the Federal Circuit dismissed yet another type of relationship from falling within the 
“direction or control” standard.118  Specifically, the Defendants in this case formed a strategic 
partnership to enable their two separate programs to work together.
119
  The Defendants also 
worked cooperatively in selling the two programs together as unit.
120
  Therefore, by determining 
that such a working relationship does not rise to the level of the “direction or control” necessary 
to find joint infringement, the Federal Circuit dismissed yet another type of relationship from the 
now seemingly elusive requirement. 
Interestingly, Judge Newman was diametrically opposed to the majority’s decision.121  
She specifically took issue with the fact the defendants were not found liable for patent 
infringement even though they took active steps to collaborate and practice every limitation of 
the claims.
122
  Judge Newman went even as far as to say that the majority’s decisions “is 
incorrect as a matter of law.”123  Taking it one step further, Judge Newman challenged the entire 
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theory of joint infringement as established in BMC Resources and later affirmed in 
Muniauction.
124
  Judge Newman ultimately held that a collaborative effort, as in this case, a 
“strategic partnership” to develop and sell what was once separate products as one integrated and 
infringing unit “is not immune from infringement simply because the participating entities have a 
separate corporate status.”125  Critically, this dissent illustrates that at least one of the Federal 
Circuit judges was not ready to whole heartedly accept the relatively new standard set forth in 
BMC Resources. 
d. Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 629 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 
2010) 
 
Not long after Golden Hour, the Federal Circuit decided Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight 
Networks, Inc., 629 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
126
  Faced with yet another joint infringement 
case, the Federal Circuit was presented with another opportunity to further delineate the 
“direction or control” standard set forth in BMC Resources and affirmed in Muniauction.  At first 
blush the issue on appeal did not appear to require further explanation on the “direction or 
control” standard, but simply the application of the standard to the particular facts on the 
record.
127
  The Federal Circuit, with a panel consisting of Judges Rader, Linn, and Prost, 
however, took this opportunity to once again expound the “direction or control” standard by 
setting forth seemingly the final nail in the coffin for patent owners relying on joint infringement 
to prove liability.  Arguably, the Federal Circuit in Akamai took the final leap regarding the 
“direction or control” standard by answering the question left open from Muniauction:  what 
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relationship among the accused joint infringers is sufficient to satisfy the “direction or control” 
standard.
128
   
Without delving too far into the background of the case, the asserted patents, and the 
related technology, Akamai brought a patent infringement against Limelight asserting that 
Limelight infringed various claims of U.S. Patent Nos. 6,108,703 (“the ‘703 patent”), 7,103,645 
(“the ’645 patent”), and 6,553,413 (“the ’413 patent”).129  The patents relate generally to a 
system and method for allowing a website content provider to outsource the storage and delivery 
of predetermined portions of its website in order to provide a more efficient and reliable website 
for its visitors.
130
  At trial, Akamai only asserted method claims against Limelight and it was 
undisputed among the parties that Limelight did not, itself, perform every step required by the 
asserted method claims.
131
  Notably, it is Limelight’s customers, the website content providers, 
with whom Limelight has standard customer contracts that perform several steps of the asserted 
method claims.
132
   
The Federal Circuit began its analysis by reiterating, for at least the fourth time, the now 
well established standard for determining liability where no one party performs all the steps of a 
claimed method.
133
  In, what seemed to be, at the time, a watershed moment in the development 
of joint infringement theory, the Federal Circuit finally set forth the exact relationship among 
accused infringers that is required to satisfy the elusive “direction and control” standard.  In 
setting a bright-line rule, the Federal Circuit held, that as a matter of law, “there can only be joint 
infringement when there is an agency relationship between the parties who perform the method 
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steps or when one party is contractually obligated to the other to perform the steps.”134  The 
Court also went on to further clarify the contractually obligated prong of the relationship 
requirement, by first indicating that just a contract between the parties is not sufficient to find 
either party liable for joint infringement.
135
  To the contrary, the Court indicated that to satisfy 
the contractually obligated prong, the contracted party must actually be obligated to perform the 
steps of the claimed method so that the contracted party’s activities may be attributable to the 
accused infringer.
136
  In the midst of setting forth this rule, the Court once again side-stepped the 
looming issue that this rule creates a loophole for accused infringers to avoid liability 
completely, and instead placed the entire onus on the patent owner instructing them to draft 
better claims—i.e., claims that only require one party to infringe.137 
After the Akamai decision, it seemed that the road to further develop the law on joint 
infringement had finally reached its end.  That changed when on April 20, 2011, the Federal 
Circuit vacated the Akamai decision, reinstated the original appeals, and ordered an en banc 
rehearing of the case.
138
  In an apparent attempt to re-evaluate the last five years of joint 
infringement jurisprudence, the Federal Circuit specifically requested the parties to file new 
briefs “addressing the following issue: If separate entities each perform separate steps of a 
method claim, under what circumstances would that claim be directly infringed and to what 
extent would each of the parties be liable?”139  The en banc case has been fully briefed by both 
parties and a voluminous number of amici curiae briefs were filed on behalf of countless 
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interested parties.  Oral argument for this case was held on November 18, 2011 before the entire 
Federal Circuit.  A decision in this case is still pending. 
e. Centillion Data Sys., LLC v. Qwest Communs. Int'l, 631 F.3d 1279 (Fed. Cir. 
2011) 
 
Following the Akamai decision was Centillion Data Sys., LLC v. Qwest Communs. Int’l, 
631 F.3d 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2011), the next step in the evolution of the theory of joint 
infringement.
140
  Here, the Federal Circuit, with a panel comprising of Judges Lourie, Linn, and 
Moore, was presented two issues:  (1) what constitutes “use” of a system claim under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 271(a); and (2) how does this definition of “use” apply to direct infringers and infringement 
under joint infringement or vicarious liability of a system claim.
141
  Like all the previous cases, 
the asserted claims in Centillion raised issues of joint infringement—that is, multiple parties 
were required to infringe the asserted claims.
142
  The difference here is that the asserted claims 
were system claims and not method claims.
143
  Therefore, the Federal Circuit had to determine 
whether the theory of joint infringement, as set forth in BMC Resources and its progeny, applied 
to system or apparatus claims and more specifically, how it applied when it is the “use” of the 
accused system that causes the system claim to be infringed.
144
  This was a question of first 
impression for the Federal Circuit.
145
 
This litigation commenced when Centillion accused Qwest of infringing claims 1, 8, 10, 
and 46 of U.S. Patent No. 5,287,270 (“the ’270 patent).146  For the sake of brevity, the ’270 
patent is directed to a system provided by a service provider that collects and processes call data 
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and subsequently delivers the data to its customers in a format acceptable for display and further 
processing by the customer’s personal computer.147  Exemplary claim 1 requires: (1) a storage 
means; (2) a data processing means; (3) a transferring means; and (4) a personal computer data 
processing means.
148
  The parties do not dispute that the asserted system claims require both a 
“back-end” system owned and provided by a service provider and a “front-end” system owned 
and provided by an end user or customer.
149
 
In relying on its decision in NTP, the Federal Circuit held “that to ‘use’ a system for 
purposes of infringement, a party must put the invention into service, i.e., control the system as a 
whole and obtain benefit from it.”150  The Federal Circuit then took a rather broad approach with 
respect to the “control” required under the “use” standard.151  In other words, the “control” 
required was more analogous to simply using the system than the ordinary meaning of the word 
“control”—having power over someone or being in command.  The Federal Circuit went on to 
hold that “direct infringement by ‘use’ of a system claim ‘requires a party … to use each and 
every … element of a claimed [system].’”152.  Most importantly, to infringe a system claim, the 
user simply must use all the elements of the claimed system to make them work for their 
patented purpose—not have physical control over all the elements of the claimed system.153 
Ultimately, the Federal Circuit held that Qwest’s customers “used” Qwest’s system under 
35 U.S.C. § 271(a) because the users cause Qwest’s system to perform certain processes and they 
obtain a benefit from the system.
154
  The Court also determined that Qwest’s customers are 
single users of its system, and that there was thus no need to perform a joint infringement 
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analysis under BMC Resources.
155
  On the other hand, the Federal Circuit determined that under 
NTP, Qwest does not “use” the claimed system because Qwest does not put the personal 
computer data processing means into service—that is, Qwest does not control its customer’s 
personal computer nor does it obtain benefit from it.
156
 
Because Qwest did not use each and every element of the claimed system, the Federal 
Circuit determined that Qwest could only be found liable for direct infringement of the asserted 
system claims under a theory of joint infringement.
157
  The Federal Circuit then traced the 
evolution of joint infringement from BMC Resources to Akamai, and acknowledged that for 
cases where a method claim requires the actions of more than one party, the law requires either 
the existence of an agency relationship or a contractual obligation to perform the steps.
 158
  
Relying on its decisions from BMC Resources, Muniauction, Akamai, and Cross Medical, the 
Federal Circuit held that Qwest was not vicariously liable for the actions of its customers 
because neither the requisite agency relationship nor a contractual obligation existed between 
Qwest and its customers.
159
  In a side note, the Federal Circuit also held that Qwest did not 
“make” the entire claimed system for the same reasons it did not “use” the entire claimed 
system.
160
 
The takeaway from Centillion is simple:  the Federal Circuit endorsed the bright-line rule 
regarding joint infringement set forth in Akamai and applied it to system claims, thereby 
providing that joint infringement theory can apply to both method and system claims.
161
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f. McKesson Techs. Inc. v. Epic Sys. Corp., 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 7531 (Fed. 
Cir. Apr. 12, 2011) 
 
In what is, at the moment, the last chapter of the joint infringement saga from the Federal 
Circuit, McKesson Techs., Inc. v. Epic Sys. Corp., 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 7531 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 
12, 2011) was decided on April 12, 2011 by a panel comprising of Judges Linn, Bryson, and 
Newman.
162
  McKesson presented yet another set of method claims requiring multiple parties to 
infringe them.
163
  In this case, the Plaintiff, McKesson alleged that a software developer, Epic, 
induced the infringement of its patent by licensing the infringing software to health-care 
providers, who in turn, offered it to their patients.
164
  The parties agreed that the claimed method 
required the acts of both the health-care providers and their patients.
165
  Therefore, the sole issue 
on appeal was whether the relationship between Epic’s customers, here the health-care providers, 
and the users of the software, here the patients of the health-care providers, was such that 
performance of the claimed method step by the patients was attributable to the health-care 
provider.
166
 
McKesson presented two arguments for finding Epic liable for indirect infringement of 
the asserted claims:  (1) that the special nature of the doctor-patient relationship rises to the level 
of “direction or control” sufficient to establish joint infringement; and (2) that the recent Federal 
Circuit precedent is simply wrong and this panel should follow traditional laws of torts with 
respect to joint tort-feasor liability.
167
  Relying on BMC Resources, Muniauction, and Akamai, 
the Federal Circuit rejected both arguments.
168
  First, the Federal Circuit established that the 
doctor-patient relationship does not “give rise to an agency relationship or impose on patients a 
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contractual obligation such that the voluntary actions of patients can be said to represent the 
vicarious actions of their doctors.”169  Second, the Federal Circuit made clear that decisions from 
prior panels are binding on subsequent panels unless they are overturned via an en banc panel.
170
  
Moreover, the Federal Circuit yet again, reiterated the current joint infringement standard—in 
order to find direct infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), where no one party performs all the 
steps of a claimed method, an agency relationship or contractual obligation must exist between 
the joint infringers.
171
 
What is again arguably more important than the majority opinion is the concurrence by 
Judge Bryson and the dissent by Judge Newman.  In the concurrence, Judge Bryson 
acknowledged that the majority reached the correct decision in light of BMC Resources and its 
progeny.
172
  However, in the same breath, Judge Bryson questioned the entire concept of joint 
infringement as set forth in BMC Resources and stated that the issue may be important enough to 
warrant an en banc review.
173
  Judge Newman took Judge Bryson’s concurrence one step further 
and expressly repudiated the majority’s decision as disserving commerce, fairness, and 
innovation incentives, while also being contrary to statute, precedent that predates BMC 
Resources, and long-held principles of common law torts liability.
174
  It is clear from her dissent 
that Judge Newman is diametrically opposed to the recent Federal Circuit decisions in the area of 
joint infringement and particularly rejects the notion that there can only be direct infringement 
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when a single entity performs or directs or controls each and every step of the claimed 
method.
175
 
Following the McKesson decision, on May 26, 2011, the Federal Circuit vacated the 
decision, reinstated the original appeals, and ordered an en banc rehearing of the case.
176
  In yet 
another attempt to re-evaluate the last five years of joint infringement jurisprudence, the Federal 
Circuit specifically requested the parties to file new briefs to answer the following questions:  “1. 
If separate entities each perform separate steps of a method claim, under what circumstances, if 
any, would either entity or any third party be liable for inducing infringement or for contributory 
infringement? See Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate, Inc., 720 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1983).  2. 
Does the nature of the relationship between the relevant actors—e.g., service provider/user; 
doctor/patient—affect the question of direct or indirect infringement liability?”177  The en banc 
case has been fully briefed by both parties and a voluminous number of amici curiae briefs were 
filed on behalf of countless interested parties.  Oral argument for this case was held on 
November 18, 2011 before an en banc panel.  A decision in this case is still pending. 
 
IV. JOINT INFRINGEMENT AND THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW 
 
In light of the Federal Circuit decisions discussed above, the current trend in the law on 
joint infringement seems clear.  On the one hand, it appears that the Federal Circuit has set an 
almost insurmountable standard for Plaintiffs with respect to proving liability for infringement of 
a method claim under a theory of joint infringement.  Yet, on the other hand, the Federal Circuit 
has set forth a significantly lower standard with regards to proving liability for infringement of a 
system claim that requires more one than one party to operate it.    
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More specifically, in accordance with Federal Circuit law, to directly infringe a method 
claim an alleged infringer must perform, or direct or control a third party to perform, each and 
every step of the claimed method.
178
  In both Akamai and McKesson, the Federal Circuit held 
that the “direction or control” standard requires the alleged infringer to either have an agency 
relationship with the third party or a contractual relationship obligating the third party to perform 
the steps of the claimed method.
179
  The interesting thing to note here is that both Akamai and 
McKesson were vacated and are now both pending en banc before the Federal Circuit.
180
  
Accordingly, while the express requirement that an agency relationship or contractual obligation 
exist between multiple parties is not exactly the current state of the law, at the moment, BMC 
Resources and Muniauction are still good law in this area.  Therefore, to establish joint 
infringement under BMC Resources and Muniauction requires, at a minimum, that the alleged 
infringer be vicariously liable for a third party’s actions, which, as the Federal Circuit has 
acknowledged, bears a striking resemblance to simply requiring an agency relationship.
181
 
While the Federal Circuit seemingly set forth an overwhelmingly high standard for 
proving liability under joint infringement of a method claim, it was surprisingly more lenient 
with respect to establishing infringement of system claims that require more than one party to 
operate it.  Particularly, in Centillion, the Federal Circuit made it easy for patent owners to avoid 
joint infringement altogether by setting forth a broad definition for establishing the “use” of a 
system for purposes of infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
182
  The Federal Circuit 
specifically held that for an accused infringer to be found liable for direct infringement for its 
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“use” of a claimed system, the accused infringer must put the invention into service, i.e., “control 
the system as a whole and obtain benefit from it.”183  Critically, it does not matter whether parts 
of the claimed system are not in the possession of the accused infringer, as long as the accused 
infringer is using elements of the claimed system for its patented purpose.
184
   
Accordingly, under this liberal standard of “use,” accused infringers will often be unable 
to establish that the claimed system requires multiple parties to be infringed—a threshold issue 
that must be established before joint infringement can even be considered
185—and thus more 
often than not joint infringement may never even come into play for system claims.  It is, 
therefore, significantly easier for patent owners to find an accused infringer liable for 
infringement of a system claim, even if the system claim, on its face, appears to raise a joint 
infringement issue.  With that said, if a Court determines that multiple parties are required to 
“use” the claimed system, the Court would then be forced to apply the more stringent “direction 
or control” standard as it would for method claims.186 
The bottom-line is clear, to establish joint infringement under the new Federal Circuit 
standard, “neither collaboration nor joint action nor facilitation nor authorization nor invitation 
can overcome the immutable barrier to infringement when all of the participating entities are not 
under the ‘control or direction’ of a mastermind infringer.”187   
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V. IMPACT ON THE RIGHTS OF PATENT OWNERS AND BEYOND 
 
The current standard for determining patent infringement via joint infringement liability, 
as discussed in detail above, poses several obvious issues for patent owners, innovation, and the 
patent system in general.  The most obvious issue is that the “direction or control” standard 
creates an easily exploitable loophole for all potential infringers of patents having claims that 
require at least two parties to infringe.  For example, under the Federal Circuit’s joint 
infringement standard, an accused infringer can avoid infringing claims requiring the actions of 
more than one party by merely having just one task of the patented claim be performed by a third 
party.   As such, with this new standard in place, accused patent infringers are essentially 
provided with a license to knowingly and egregiously infringe patents without any repercussions.  
Consequently, Defendants are unjustly benefitting at the expense of patent owners’ time, effort, 
and resources that they are expending to develop new inventions.   
It should not be this easy to avoid patent infringement.  Not to mention, the standard 
encourages, if not begs, accused infringers to conduct business in this manner simply to avoid 
liability for patent infringement.  The patent system was not created so that it can be 
circumvented with such ease.  Nor was it developed to encourage such an egregious unjust 
enrichment for accused infringers.  The patent system was designed as a way to increase the 
storehouse of public knowledge by encouraging the development and disclosure of otherwise 
secret inventions in exchange for allowing inventors to have exclusive rights over their 
inventions for a limited time.
188
  Encouraging the type of behavior employed by accused 
infringers, as the Federal Circuit has done and continues to do, runs contrary to the very reason 
the patent system was created.  The new joint infringement standard leaves patent owners 
remediless to joint or collaborative infringers that strategically divide the tasks of a patented 
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claim requiring actions by multiple parties in an effort to escape liability for patent infringement.  
Moreover, this type of conduct deprives patent owners their end of the bargain for disclosing 
their invention to the public by affording them significantly less protection then originally 
bargained for, while also flouting the entire patent system.  
Leaving patent owners remediless for the infringement of their patents will most likely be 
detrimental to the public as well.   For example, an alarming consequence resulting from the new 
joint infringement standard is the possibility that corporations, inventors, and innovators alike 
will cease or dramatically reduce their research and development efforts.  It is particularly likely 
that corporations and inventors will expend less time and resources for research and innovation.  
As such, the new standard for proving joint infringement is likely to stifle innovation.  The 
logical sequence of events is simple:  (i) the new standard significantly weakens the protection 
afforded by patents for inventions that require multiple parties to infringe, also coined, 
interactive inventions, by Judge Newman of the Federal Circuit; (ii) because patent owners are 
essentially stripped of their exclusive rights to these inventions, entities will discontinue 
expending its resources to develop new inventions.  The incentive to innovate essentially 
evaporates with the implementation of this newly minted rule.  This consequence is particularly 
distressing, as the need to further develop and innovate is critical to the health of this country’s 
economy.  Not to mention, it was this incentive that served as one of the main reasons for 
creating the U.S. patent system.  We are better off as a whole if people continue to innovate. 
It is clear that the Federal Circuit’s newly minted “direction or control” standard 
detrimentally impacts patent owners and the public.  The new rule leaves patent owners 
remediless against joint infringers working collaboratively to infringe a patent—a consequence 
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that is simply unjust.  It also completely undermines the main goal of the patent system:  creating 
incentives to innovate while spreading knowledge for the good of the public. 
 
VI. CLOSING THE JUDICIALLY CREATED LOOPHOLE 
 
The above analysis begs the question:  if the new rule is wrong than what is the correct 
standard for determining joint infringement?  The following sections provide what should be the 
standard applied in joint infringement cases as well as several solutions for closing the loophole 
created by the Federal Circuit. 
a. The Correct Standard for Determining Direct Infringement by Multiple 
Parties 
 
The new law on joint infringement is unsupported by precedent predating BMC 
Resources, completely out of sync with the law on tort liability, and contrary to the patent law 
statutes and public policy. 
Both Supreme Court and Federal Circuit precedent prior to BMC Resources is clear on 
the issue of infringement by multiple parties.  In Aro, the Supreme Court analogized joint 
infringers to joint tort-feasors.
189
  Notably, the Supreme Court makes no mention of a standard 
requiring a particular relationship status between the separate entities causing the infringement 
nor does the Supreme Court even raise the issue that one party must “direct or control” the other.  
The Supreme Court also alluded to the fact that a theory of tort liability known as joint and 
several liability is the applicable standard to apply in patent infringement cases involving 
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multiple parties.
190
  Moreover, it has long been the practice of U.S. Courts to employ the 
common-law principles of torts in patent infringement cases.
191
 
The Federal Circuit also appeared to establish a similar standard for patent infringement 
by multiple parties pre-BMC Resources.  Specifically, the Federal Circuit in Fromson v. Advance 
Offset Plate, Inc., 720 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1983), determined that contributory infringement can 
be found when the accused infringer’s customer performed one of the steps of the claimed 
method.
192
  The Federal Circuit explained that “[b]ecause Advance’s customers, not Advance, 
applied the diazo coating, Advance cannot be liable for direct infringement …, but could be 
liable for contributory infringement.”193  In following the Fromson standard, several years later 
the Federal Circuit fully acknowledged a jury instruction attempting to summarize the state of 
the law of joint infringement as the correct statement of the law.
194
  The jury instruction was as 
follows: 
It is not necessary for the acts that constitute infringement to be 
performed by one person or entity.  When infringement results 
from the participation and combined action(s) of more than one 
person or entity, they are all joint infringers and jointly liable for 
patent infringement.  Infringement of a patented process or method 
cannot be avoided by having another perform one step of the 
process or method.  Where the infringement is the result of the 
participation and combined action(s) of one or more persons or 
entities, they are joint infringers and are jointly liable for the 
infringement.
195
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Accordingly, in 2006, the law of joint infringement based on Supreme Court and Federal Circuit 
precedent was clear:  parties collaborating to infringe a patent are joint infringers and therefore 
are both jointly liable to the patent owner.
196
  
 Because patent infringement is considered a strict liability tort
197
 and has developed 
according to concepts of tort liability,
198
 it is only logical that patent infringement remain aligned 
with the common principles of tort liability.  However, the new standard for joint infringement is 
completely out of sync with the common concepts of tort liability and in particular with the 
concept of joint tort-feasors.  The law of tort liability for a harm resulting from the acts of two 
parties is clearly represented in the Restatement Second of Torts.  For example, § 875 states that, 
“each of two or more persons whose tortious conduct is a legal cause of a single and indivisible 
harm to the injured party is subject to liability to the injured party for the entire harm,”199            
§ 876(a) sets forth, “for harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, one 
is subject to liability if he does a tortious act in concert with the other or pursuant to a common 
design with him,”200 and § 877(c) provides, “for harm resulting to a third person from the 
tortious conduct of another, one is subject to liability if he permits the other to act upon his 
premises or with his instrumentalities, knowing or having reason to know that the other is acting 
or will act tortuously.”201  Each of the aforementioned tort principles sets forth a standard for 
finding liability for joint tort-feasors.  Notably, none of the sections of the Restatement Second of 
Torts require one party to “direct or control” the other.  All that is required for finding liability 
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under concepts of tort liability is a showing that the parties acted in concert or pursuant to a 
common design.   
It is this foundation that the standard for joint patent infringement should derive from.  
However, because patent infringement is a type of strict liability tort,
202
 the standard for joint 
infringement of a patent should slightly diverge from common law joint tort-feasor principles.  In 
particular, a cause of action exists against a joint tort-feasor based on causation and 
foreseeability.  However, considering that at least one act necessary to find infringement in many 
joint infringement cases is generally performed by an end user or customer of the accused 
infringer, relying on just causation and foreseeability under these circumstances would create an 
unjust and unworkable result.  It would be completely unreasonable to extend liability for joint 
patent infringement to every foreseeable use of the patent, including the use by unsuspecting 
consumers, who know nothing about the patent, but who merely provide the last piece or step of 
the claimed invention.  Therefore, while common law tort principles with respect to joint tort-
feasors is the proper starting point for determining the correct standard for joint patent 
infringement, it is essential to strike a balance between merely requiring two parties to act in 
concert and requiring one party to “direct or control” the other.   As will be discussed below, the 
appropriate standard for joint patent infringement should require a particular level of culpable 
conduct on the part of all the joint infringers that are to be held liable for patent infringement. 
 Finally, the newly minted law on joint infringement is contrary to both the patent law 
statutes and public policy.  Section 101 of the Patent Act clearly sets forth the requirements for 
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obtaining a patent.
203
  Accordingly, anyone who invents something new is entitled to obtain a 
patent for their invention.   
With the advent of the information-age a new type of technology developed that served to 
benefit the public.  Specifically, advances in computer systems led to the development of new 
interactive computer managed methods and systems requiring interaction between computer 
systems and computer users.  In light of these new discoveries, inventors applied for and were 
eventually granted patents on these new types of inventions.  These types of inventions meet all 
the requirements and conditions of the Patent Act and therefore are entitled to receive the 
benefits of the patent system.  However, the Federal Circuit’s new standard for joint 
infringement essentially removes these inventions from the purview of the patent system because 
the exclusive right allegedly granted to the patent owners via these issued patents is nonexistent.  
Even though these patent owners have technically been granted “patents” by the Patent Office, 
from their point of view they are not patents at all because they fail to serve the most basic 
function of a patent:  the right to exclude others from making, using, and selling their invention.  
Taking it one step further, the patents granted are arguably not even patents by law because they 
cannot be infringed and therefore do not afford their owners any rights, let alone the right to 
exclude.  Because these inventions qualify for patents under the Patent Act, owners of these 
patents should not be left remediless—such a result turns the patent system on its head and runs 
contrary to the patent laws of this country.   
Finally, none of the sub-sections of 35 U.S.C. § 271, the patent infringement statute, 
mention, let alone require, that a patent owner must prove liability under joint infringement by 
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showing that the accused infringer “directs or controls” a third party.204  Not to mention, a closer 
reading of 35 U.S.C. § 271 in light of 35 U.S.C. § 101, the patentable subject matter statute, 
reveals the use of similar language for setting forth who may be found liable for patent 
infringement and who may be eligible to obtain a patent.  Notably, both statutes use the same 
pronoun, “whoever.”  It is well established that there can be multiple inventors named on a 
patent.
205
  Therefore, it stands to reason that use of the pronoun, “whoever,” in the infringement 
context indicates it was contemplated that there can be multiple infringers of a patent. 
b. Closing the Joint Infringement Loophole 
 
While the current state of the law for determining liability under a theory of joint 
infringement is contrary to both the Patent Act and earlier precedent and is out of sync with 
traditional tort law, there are several ways to remedy the situation.  First, the most logical way to 
handle cases regarding joint infringement is to follow the law of torts for joint tort-feasors with 
an added culpability requirement.  To avoid holding the general population jointly and severally 
liable for patent infringement, most of whom are innocent consumers, it is particularly important 
to distinguish the concepts of joint tort-feasors and joint patent infringers.  As mentioned above, 
the concept of joint and several liability under torts law relies largely on causation and 
foreseeability principles.
206
   The appropriate standard for joint patent infringement should derive 
from common law tort principles but should include an additional culpability requirement.  More 
specifically, the proper standard for joint infringement should not only require the patent owner 
to show that multiple parties acted in concert but that the parties purposefully collaborated to 
obtain a benefit from the collaboration.  It is this standard that obtains the appropriate balance 
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between joint tort-feasors liability and the strict “direction and control” standard set forth by the 
Federal Circuit.  This result would also serve to realign the law on joint infringement with earlier 
Supreme Court and Federal Circuit precedent.   
A second remedy would be to have Congress enact a new provision under 35 U.S.C. § 
271 to specifically codify the above-identified concept of joint tort-feasors liability with the 
addition of a culpability requirement.  In particular, the new legislation should be drafted to set 
forth the necessary relationship that must be established between multiple parties and the 
required culpability necessary to justify liability for patent infringement.   
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
The current state of the law on joint infringement under BMC Resources and its progeny 
has created an insurmountable loophole for patent owners to prove infringement of claims 
requiring multiple parties.  The standard set forth by BMC Resources unjustly leaves patent 
owners without a remedy for patent infringement.  Moreover, the standard is contrary to the 
Patent Act, earlier precedent, tort law, and public policy.  As such, to rebalance the scales of 
justice back towards patent owners joint infringement theory needs to be realigned with well 
established concepts of tort law, where the only requirement to prove joint infringement is a 
showing that separate parties acted in concert, with the necessary culpability to infringe the 
asserted claim. 
